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THE S I S
THE DOCTRINE OF SET-OFF IN EQUITY AS EFFECTED
EY INSOLVENCY
-B-,--
C. W. B u r t
Cornell University Law School
1893

The right of a defendant when an action is begun
against him to plead in bar some claim holden by him run-
ning against the complainant, upon which the complainant
is liable in a present cause of action is known as the
right or doctrine of set-off. This doctrine is essential
ly a doctrine of equity and existed in equity(though
sometimes doubted)long befa,±'-e the statutes allowing set-
off at law ; becausethe courts of equity said :- "natur-
al justice and equity dictate that the demands of parties
mutually indebted should be set-off against each other
and only the balance be recovered. But notwithstanding
the fact that from early Coinmon Law times the doctrine of
set-off was applied with considerable liberality in equity
and in spite of the fact that the analogous doctrine of
compensation as applied in the Roman Law was continually
before the judges, the Common Law courts did not recog-
nize its existence and required that each claim must be
prosecuted separately for the purpose of simplicity of
procedure, "The natural sense of mankind", says Lord
Mansfield, was first shocked at this in the case of bank-
rupts and it was provided by statutes passed during the
reign of Anne that in case of bankruptcy set-off would
2be allowed in law as well as in equity, and by statute of
5 Geo. II e 30 this right of set-off was extended to all
cases of mutual debts. These statutes did not take
away the original jurisdiction which equity had acquired
but merely extended it to courts of law allowing them the
right to set-off in many cases where it was not before
allowed in equity.
In construing and interpreting these statutes the
courts of law formulated a number of rules. They re-
quired that the demand sought to be set-off, ist, a legal
cause of action ex contractu existing at the commencement
of the suit. 2nd, the set-off rrfust be against the com-
plainant in the same capacity in which he sues and 3rd,
the demands must be liquidated. As "equity follows the
law", courts of equity in construing the sarm statutes
when they cae before them observed and applied the sam
rules as were applied in the Common Law tribunals.
Equity will not as a general rule allow a set-off in any
case where it would have been denied at law. But to
this there is an exception. A court of equity being a
court of conscience will where by reason of some addition-
al natural equity the law works injustice go beyond the
statute and allow a set-off without regard to the fixed
rules of law. Insolvency in all jurisdictions is recog-
nized as such an additional equity as will to a greater
or less extent vary the legal rules as laid down by the
courts in their respective states.
We will now proceed to examine how far equity has
interfered and varied the legal rules in cases of insol-
vency and in so doing- the first rule to be considered and
the one of greatest importance is that the debt sought to
be set-off must be an existing cause of action. This
rule has been before the courts of this country the most
frequently andthe conclusions arrived at differ more
widely than the conclusions upon either of the other
rules. In reference to this question the states may be
said to divide themselves into two groups. The 1st
group of which it may be said New York is a typical exam-
ple, keeps very close to the legal rules, only allowing
the set-off in such cases as it would be allowed at law
while the 2nd group represented by Tennessee takes a very
liberal view allowing a set-off in all cases whethcer the
amount be due and an existing cause of action or not.
The cases which arise and in which it is sought to
obtain a set-off of an ununtured claim may also be said
to be of two kinds :- 1st, where at the time of the in-
solvency the claim against the defendant was not yet due
but the claim of the defendant against the insolvent
which it is sought to off-set is due and 2nd, where the
claiLa sued upon was due at the time of the insolvency but
the claim sought to be set-off by the defendant is not
yet due.
And first in reference to the decisions in states
where the rules of law are strictly followed. This first
question was decided early in New York state in the case
of Lindsay v. Paige and has since been passed upon sever-
al times the last being the case of Richards v. LaTourette
In this case the complainant was an assignee in insol-
vency of a bank. The bank at the time of its failure
owned a bond and mortgage upon which the defendant was
liable but which was not due at the time of the assign-
ment. The defendant also had a sum of money on deposit
in the bank at the time of the assignment and now claims
in this action to foreclose the mortgage the right to
set-off the amount of the deposit against the amount of
the bond. The lower court in this case denied the right
upon the sole ground that at the time of the assignment
to the plaintiff the debt due to the plaintiff was not
yet matured. But upon appeal to the highest court the
set-off was allowed and the reason and justice of the
decision is evi ent. Here "A" had a claim against "B"
and transferred it to "C" as assignee in insolvency.
At the time of the assignement to "C" by "A" the claim
against "B" was not yet due but the claim in favor of "B"
against "A" is due. When the claim matures "C" sues "B"
and the debt sought to be set-off by "B" was due at the
time of the assignment. Consequently there is no con-
tract which is being interfered with so far as the claim
sought to be set-off is concerned, that is the claim ow-
ing by the plaintiff. But it is the claim owing to the
plaintiff which was not due at the time of the assignment
and it is the defendant who is prejudiced if any one by
the set-offiwaiving the credit to which he was still en-
titled. Consequently if he insists on the payment ie
is merely reliaquishing a right to delay payment of that
which he will owe and the contract and rights of the other
party are in no way interfered with.
The 2nd class of cases to be considered is where the
6claim sued upon w-:s due at the time of the assignment in
insolvency, but the claim sought to be set-off by the
defendant has not yet matured or had not matured at the
time of the insolvency. This question arose in the earlyv
New York case of Bradley v. Angell. In this case a
a4Mwas brought by the assignees in insolvency upon a
book account and it was sought to set-off in this action
three notes of the defendant which were not yet matured
because of the insolvency of the complainant and it was
sought by the defendant to justify this set-off upon the
reasoning applied in the first class of cases already
considered. But the court said :- "There is no analogy
between the case cited and the present. Where a debt
is due from the insolvent debtor the right of the creditor
to payment is absolute. Natural equity and law unite
in binding the debtor to a fulfilliuent of his obligation.
Equity by compelling a set-off under such circumstances
with the consent of the person entitled to the credit
and where 3rd, persons are not injured follows the law.
It creates no new obligation and deprives the insolvent
of no right or privelege which he could justly exercise.
By allowing a set-off in this case the assignee would be
7deprived of a legal right secured to the assignor by con-
tract and the complainants would obtain pay~ment of their
debt before it bec~ine due and to the prejudice of other
creditors of the insolvent". It would seem as though
this case would have settled the question as to the right
of a defendant to set-off an unmatured obligation on the
ground of insolvency in New York but notwithstanding the
apparent plainness of the decision we find the Supreme
Court as late as 42 Hun. holding that insolvency is a
sufficient equity to justify set-off of an unmatured note.
This was a very peculiar case and led to a great deal of
uncertainty as to what the law was upon this point. In
this case the plaintiffs became liable upon a note of the
defendant relying upon the representation of the defen-
dant that the note was "as good as gold". Upon the
maturity of the note the complainants were compelled to
pay it. At the time the note was given the firm was and
has since been insolvent and upon a day subsequent but
prior to the maturity of the note made an assignment for
the benefit of creditors. The complainant asks to have
the amount of this note set-off against an indebtedness
owing from him to the firm and strange to say in spite of
Bradley v. Angell the court allowed the set-off. The
judge in his opinion basing his decision upon the follow-
ing reasoning, says "The court as we hiave seen has found
the makers of this note were at the time of the delivery
of the note to the plaintiff insolvent and that all that
was necessary to make the complainants liable as indois-
ers upon the note was the presentation of the note at its
maturity, demanding payment,and serving of notice of non-
payment. This contingency did not depend upon any act
of the makers or the defendants. A court of equity has
the power to permit an equitable set-off in cases not
within the statute, if from the nature of the claim or
the situation of the parties justice cannot be obtained
by a cross action, and that even though the debt of the
complainant to the defendant is not due if the defendant
is insolvent". This case was carried to the court of
appeals and was there affirmed but upon an entirely dif-
ferent ground. When the court looked over the situation
they said while we will not depart from the w11 that
the debt must be an existing cause of action yet we will
affirm the decision of the lower court because the debt
sought to be set-off is actually due. When the complain-
ant obtained the endorsement by means of a false repre-
sentation a right of action in the nature of assumpsit
was created and such claim is a proper subject of' set-off
in an action brought by a party against whom it exists.
The judge says :- "This money thiis obtained is in contem-
plation of law money received for the use of the party
who is defrauded and the law implies a promise on the part
of the person who obtains it to return it to the
rightful owner". It was this decision which misled the
business men of the state and not only the business men
but the courts were also in doubt as to what was supposed
would be the attitude of the higher court when the question
as to whether the set-off of an unmatured claim would be
allowed came fairly before the court for its decision.
From the result reached by the Court of Appeals in Roth-
childs v. Mack the Supreme Court came to the conclusion
that the Court of Appeals would uphold the doctrine as
unqualifiedly laid down by them in that case and accora-
ingly when the question again came before them in Fera v.
Wickleam they again held (relying upon the statement of
the Court of Appeals in Rothchilds v. Mack that the cor-
rectness of the decision was not intended to be dmied
and that it was left without either affirming or disaf-
firming the view expressed by the general term) under a
similar statement of fact that the set-off should be
allowed. This last case was however also taken to the
Court of Appeals and this time the question was squarely
passed upon and decided that the debt sought to be s3t-off
must be an existing cause cf action irrespective of the
equity of insolvency. The judge says :-"When a party
asks to have set-off against a demand upon him held by
an assignee in insolvency for the benefit of creditors
a claim against the insolvent estate it will be allowed,
provided his was a claim upon the estate which was due
when the assignment was made upon the ground that by
reason of the existence of cross demands at the time of
the assignment which were due(or might have been due at
the creditors election) an equitable adjustment by set-off
is made without interfering with the equities of others.
But after the estate has passed to an assignea upon a
trust to hold for and to distribute among creditors the
former and natural equity disappears in superior equities
vesting in the general body of creditors. They are then
interested in having equality of distribution and if a
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creditor who when the assignment was made had no right
to an offset may be allowed it afterwards he gains a pref-
erence. By the intervention of the rights of third
parties under the assignmnt the equities change with the
change in the situation of the original parties to the
misfortun3 of the creditor holding the demand against the
insolvent estate but nevertheless in accordance with
equitable principles as I deduce them from the decisions".
Thus far we have considered cases where insolvency
was the sole equi'ty upon which it was sought to uphold
the defendants right to a set-off of a yet unmatured
claim, but there is a modification of this rule found in
the New York cases which tends to soften the apparent
rigidity of the legal rules of set-off and that is that
wherever the court can say that there is an express or
implied agreement that the unmatured debt shall be set-off
against the debt due such set-off will be allowed and the
courts it would seem are very liberal in trying to find
an agreement especially where injustice would arise if
the set-off were not allowed. As to the nature of this
agreement and what is necessary in order to enoble the
defendant to set-off the lumatured liability there is a
good deal of uncertainty. In Coates v. Donnell the
only case which the question has been squarely before
the court it was held that an oral agreement was sufficient.
ut in this case the facts were peculiar : Donnell Lawson
& 'o. bankers in New York incurred liability as acceptors
on certain drafts drawn by the Mastin Bank on agreement
of the latter's cashier that the Mastin Bank would keep
a deposit with Donnell Lawson & Co. and that Donnell
Lawson & Co. could keep so much of the deposit as was
necessary to pay acceptances or prevent loss thereon.
The Mastin Bank failed before the acceptance matured.
A suit by the assignee of the Mastin Bank was brought to
recover the amount of the deposit for the benefit of the
creditors in general and this oral agreement was set up
as a defense to the action and as the grounds for allow-
ing the set-off. It is to be noted that in this case
the property tc be set-off and upon which the lien was
created was actually translerred to the pledgee so that
the objection as to a secret lien being created the prop-
erty meanwhile remaining in the general owner was avoided.
The conclusion to be drawn from this case would seem to
be that Ist, the agreement must not be of such a nature
13
as to violate the statute against preferences in volunta-
ry general assignments and 2nd, it must not be liable to
attack on the ground of a secret lien in fraud of cred-
itors. The form of the agreement must of necessity vary
with the circumstances of the transaction. Where the
debt sought to be set-off is transferred to the party
seeking the set-off in pledge the presumption of fraud is
negatived by the transfer of the possession in other
cases the chattel mortgege duly filed would accomplish
the same result.
We now come to consider the second group of states
of which it may be said Tennessee is a typical example
and in which state the question has been carefully con-
sidered in a recent case of Nashville Trust Co. & Bank
and an opposite conclusion reached to the one arrived at
by the New York courts. In this case a manufacturing
company made a general assignment to the ccmplainant for
the benefit of creditors. At the date of the assignment
the assignor company had on deposit in the bank a large
sum of money and the bank held its four notes for borrow-
ed money none of which were due at the time the assign-
ment was made. In a suit brought by the assignee in
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insolvency to recover the deposit the defendant claimed
the right to set-off these unmatured notes and the court
allowed the set-off to be made upon the exactly opposite
reasoning to that adopted by the courts of New York.
The court in this case says "this is not preference to
one creditor over another . It is only the balance re-
maining in favor of the estate after all joint settlements
with debtors that gives into the fund for distribution".
This view of the Tennessee courts is also the probable
view of the United States courts as is seen in the case
of Schuler v. Israel where a bank was garnished by the
creditors of an insolvent depositor. The depositor was
indebted to the bank in various sums some of which had
and others had not matured at the time of the garnishment
The supreme court says 'As Israel(the depositor) was
insolvent at the time of the service ofthe garnishee
process we are of the opinion that the bank had a right
to appropriate any money in its hands to the security and
payment of these obligations whether due or not". "And
while it may be true that in a suit brought by Israel
against the bank it could in an ordinary action at law
only make plea of set-off of so much of Israel's debt to
the bank as was then due it could by filing a bill in
chancery in such case alleging Israel's insolvency and
that it was compelled to pay its own debt to Israel the
debt which Israel owed it but which was not due would be
lost be relieved by a proper decree in equity".
From these cases it is apparent that the tendency
of the courts in those jurisdictions where the law has
not been settled is to adopt the more liberal view and to
allow the set-off with greater freedom. This view would
seem to be supported by the most equitable course of
reasoning not only as regards the rights of the parties
to the controversy themselves but also as to the rights
of 3rd parties. In the first place we have the general
principle of equity that a set-off will be allowed when
the party appears in good conscience to be entitled to it
and there are no opposing equal or superior equities
which will be defeated. If both parties were solvent
so that both debts might ultimately be collected the law
would afford adequate relief and there would be no in-
justice wrought to either. One party would not suffer
by being compelled to pay his debt if he might ultimately
compel the other to pay his debt according to his contract
16
But in this case if the one pays the debt due from him he
cannot conpel payment of the debt due to him and will
thereby suffer irreparible loss and this taken together
with the fact of his inability to protect himself by
set-off at law because his debt is not due create a
necessity for equitable relief. If equity will not
grant the set-off it will allow the insolvent to say that
his contract is violated and thereby defeat the manifest
equity of the defendant. It would seem that a court
of equity which looks at the "substance of things rather
than the form* ought not to be so careful of the rights
of one party to the contract as to refuse to permit a
slight variance as to him when it can be plainly seen
that thereby it will wholly destroy the contract as to
the other party. 2nd, so far as the creditors in case
of a voluntary general assignment are concerned it would
seem that the defendant seeking to off set an unmatured
obligation also has the greater equity. The object of
the voluntary general assignment is to do equal justice
to all the creditors by dividing the assets amongst them.
The assets of insolvent persons are only the balance due
the insolvent estate after deducting all proper credits
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and set-offs. To refuse the right would be to give other
creditors a preference over the creditor seeking the
set-off and would work injustice to the latter by com-
pelling him to pay in full what he owes to the insolvent
and take a pro. rata on what the insolvent owes him.
The distinction between the cases arising under the
statutes of bankruptcy and those arising under the gener-
al statutes of set-off is to be kept in mind. Under the
statute of 4 Anne it was provided that in case of bank-
ruptcy a set-off of all claim should be allowed wherever
there were mutual debts or mutual credits. The expres-
sion mutual credits is a term of broader significance
than mutual debts and includes cases which did not come
within the ordinary statute of set-off. By mutual cred-
it is meant 'a knowledge on both sides of an existing
debt due to one party and a credit by the other party
founded upon and trusting to such debt as a means of
discharging it'. In construing this statute of 4 Anne
the courts were very liberal and it was held to include
cases where the debt from the defendant was not yet due.
In some states a statute of mutual debts and credits has
been enacted corresponding to the English statute. Thus
for instance in Massachusetts under the state bankrupt
law it is held that a balance should be struck and all
claims be allowed to be set-off whether due or not while
in the same state in case of' voluntary general assign-
ment the debt sought to be set-off in an action by an
assignee in insolvency must have been due at the time of
the assignment. The New York statute prior to tile
adoption of the code was also of a similar nature. But
this provision of the English statute has practically
become a matter of history as the modern statutes have
extended the right of set-off much further than could
have been done formerly under the statutes of bankruptcy.
Most if not all of them allowing the set-off of any cause
of action existing at the commencement of the suit irre-
spective of the doctrine of mutual credit as for example
the New York code provision sec. 502. But there is one
important jurisdiction where the doctrine is still applied
and that is in the United States courts. In these courts
there being no statute of set-off the courts are left to
the Comnon Law. And in cases where the justice of the
situation demands the court will apply the doctrine of
mutual credits and allow the set-off even though not yet
19
due. Thus in a recent case the court held "although the
debt sought to be set-off was not yet due yet as the one
debt was contracted upon the faith of the other and one
of the parties being insolvent-they would apply the doc-
trine of mutual credits and allow the debt to be set-off".
We now come to consider the second rule as laid down
by the courts of law in construing the statutes of set-off
and that is that the debts must be mutual. By this is
meant the debt sought to be set-off must be due from the
complainant in the same right in which he sued. Thus a
set-off arising out of affairs in which not only the
parties to the suit but others are interested cannot be
made available as a defense. If "A" bring an action
against "B' the defendant cannot pled a note executed
by "A" and "C" jointly. This rule was applied with great
strictness at the comnon law and equity in cases where
no other additional natural equity will apply the same
rule. But notwithstanding this fact in most jurisdic-
tions when insolvency intervenes equity will allow a set-
off of a joint of legation against a separate one and
vice versa. Thus in Brewer v. Norcross 2 CEG. a bill
was filed by one partner against another for an account-
ing. The defendant partner set up by way of defense
several outside accounts against the complainant alleging
his insolvency. The court laid down the rule that
"courts of equity look beyond the form of the contract
to its real character and beyond the nominal parties, to
the parties to be affected by the decree.Wherever it is
necessary to effect a clear equity or to prevent irreme-
diable injustice the set-off will be allowed though the
debts are not mutual. In cases of insolvency or of
joint credit given on account of individual indebtedness
or where the joint debt is a mere security for the sep-
arate debt of the principal the equity is obvious and
the set-off will be allowed". It may be said that the
courts are in harmony upon this rule whether they follow
the common law rules strictly or not and where insolvency
intervenes all allow the set-off.(I)
We must here note two exceptions to the last rule
1st, in the case of savings banks where it is sought in
a suit by the assignee in insolvency of the bank to set-
off the amount of a deposit in the insolvent bank, and
(I)Williams v. Noble, 3 Mer. 618 ; Dale v. Cooke,
4 Jh. Ch. R. 13 ; Blake v. Langdon, 19 Vt. 494
Receivers V. Pat. Gas Co., 2S3.
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2nd, in case of set-off in a suit brought by the receiv-
or of a corporation to recover the amount of an unpaid
subscription in both cases the right to set-off is de-
nied in all jurisdictions. In the case of an insolvent
savings bank the set-off is denied because of the pe-
culiar character of the corporation itself. The assets
of the banks are its invested funds ; the connon con-
tributions of' all the depositors in which they all have
a common interest, as each depositor is entitled to his
prpportionate share of the profits so in equity should
each bear his proportionate share of the losses. In ca3,-
of insolvency to allow the set-off to be made would give
an unjust preference to debtor depositors over all the
others.(I) In the case of the suit by a receiver to
recover the balance unpaid upon a stock subscription the
right to set-off is denied upon the familiar theory that
the capital stock is a trust fund for the benefit of
creditors. (2)
After a consideration of the recent cases which have
been decided the conclusion is inevitable that in all
(I) Osborn v. Bryne, 43 Conn. 155.
(2) Williams v. Traphager, 38 N J. E.57.
jurisdictions where the law is not yet settled the ten-
dency of the courts is to depart from the narrow view
taken by such states as New York where the questions
were early settled according to the English rule and to
broaden the doctrine step by step until it assumes a
similarity to the Roman "compensation" where the mere
fact that cross demands exist works their extinguishment
by operation of law. Probably no state will apply the
Roman doctrine to its fullest extent but it should at
least be liberally expounded to advance justice and pre-
vent circuity of action.
